Opinion: The harsh truth behind Ukraine’s peace prospects

Plans for ending the war, rumors of a new “Minsk 3.0” contact group, preparations for elections in Ukraine… The casual observer might be excused for thinking peace in Ukraine is just around the corner. This is fueled by a lot of wishful thinking both in Ukraine and abroad, but the reality is far less rosy.
Ever since the Ukraine peace summit in Switzerland – which showcased Ukraine’s ability to gather large crowds of diplomats and state leaders, but arguably did little to move talks forward – there have been growing demands for an “exit plan.” To his credit, President Volodymyr Zelensky has publicly trumpeted a message of peace and diplomacy that Western audiences want to hear, adding that Ukrainian strength accelerates the timeline.
But Russia has shown little interest in peace, likely because it believes it’s winning. Moscow is pushing for an aggressive deal, with hints from Russian officials suggesting demands ranging from control of Ukraine’s Donbas region to that of Odesa and Kharkiv oblasts, importantly with constraints on Ukraine’s defense capabilities. These terms are unacceptable to Ukraine, but Moscow seems to hope declining Western support will eventually force Kyiv’s hand.
Western pressure for a diplomatic solution is somewhat understandable. The full-scale war has lasted 2.5 years, and Europe and the United States have provided 185 billion euros ($205.8 billion) between January 2022 and June 2024, according to the Kiel Institute’s Ukraine Support Tracker, with another 100 billion-some euros (over $100 billion) yet to be allocated.
While this aid is dwarfed by Ukraine’s own sacrifices, it is significant. Meanwhile, Western societies have faced rising living costs and a surge of populism fueled by Russian propaganda. Hence the question, “How much longer?” There’s a growing eagerness for updates on peace plans and fears that further escalation could derail talks.
This thinking partially rests on the flawed assumption that the situation can be managed into resolution – like trying to clean the Augean Stables with a carefully structured Excel sheet rather than Herculean strength.
As was the case a year ago, there is no zone of possible agreement. Russia seeks to obliterate Ukraine as a nation but would likely settle for a pause, giving it time to re-stock while Ukraine strips away defense capabilities only to be invaded again. Russia believes that, with enough pressure, Ukraine will seek temporary respite.
For Ukraine, this is the last resort. Meanwhile, Kyiv continues to look for creative, asymmetric ways to increase pressure on a brittle foe. The recently discussed long-range attacks on Russian territory are part of this strategy, potentially pushing back Russian air bases and weakening its air supremacy.
Both sides are exhausted, and backchannel negotiations are ongoing, as evidenced by a series of prisoner swaps – these don’t happen without coordination and sign-offs. But both sides are stuck, unable to move from low-level discussions to larger issues like a pause in hostilities, the return of abducted children, or nuclear safety. The gulf between them is too vast, and the hope that one side will break (a real possibility) persists.
For now, Ukraine and Russia remain locked in a war of attrition, hoping to spread the conflict to “friendly blocs” that can bear the immense costs, or alternative theaters (to oversimplify, an air defense missile used in Israel or sent to Taiwan is one that can’t protect Ukrainian cities – and vice versa).
Throughout the war, public opinion and media have fluctuated between seeing Russia as either having endless resources or being crippled by mismanagement and corruption. Proponents of the latter argue that Russia will run out of manpower, money, or tanks within the next 12 to 18 months, suggesting hope for mid-to-late 2025, or even 2026. But as Ukrainians often point out: Ukraine needs to survive until then.
The West has employed a particularly ineffective strategy to exploit Russia’s weaknesses. By introducing new weapons slowly, publicly, and on a small scale, it has diminished their impact and given Russia time to adapt.
A more optimistic take is that better planning was the focus of recent visits by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and U.K. Foreign Secretary David Lammy. Their goal, rather than fueling disappointment over not lifting the long-range strike ban, was to refine plans ahead of an expected meeting between Zelensky and U.S. President Joe Biden later this month. A detailed roadmap for Ukraine support could help coordinate the logistics, composition, and timing of supplies (all objectively a complex issues).
In the meantime, Ukraine’s allies should brace for a stream of unhelpful headlines. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Mongolia, a member of the International Criminal Court (ICC) that issued an arrest warrant for him, demonstrated the limits of international law.
The upcoming BRICS summit in the Russian city of Kazan – likely to be well-attended by leaders of the so-called Global South (including Western allies or at least partners) – will further erode the narrative of Russia’s international isolation and open the door to more diplomatic visits and trade. It could also bring a security boost in the form of a long-anticipated strategic pact with Iran (though that relationship remains unpredictable).
A series of elections in key countries could also see victories for Russia-friendly, or at least anti-system, figures. In less than two weeks, Austria’s parliamentary elections could bring the far-right, anti-Western ideologue Herbert Kickl of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) to power.
Looking further ahead, Moldova is set to elect a new president in October, a testing ground for pro-Russian candidates ahead of next year’s parliamentary elections. Czechia and Germany will hold parliamentary elections next year, with the topic of refugees likely to dominate the agenda (Germany just saw two pro-Russian parties win local elections). Poland will also elect a new president.
A possible victory for U.S. Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump, though less likely given the momentum of the Kamala Harris campaign, adds a nuanced layer. Officials in Kyiv have mixed views, fearing more “drip-feed” support from the Harris administration (a “slow death,” as one senior Ukrainian government advisor put it).
Nevertheless, a Trump presidency would likely strain the transatlantic alliance – something Russia would be eager to exploit, as it plans to do with other elections, slowly eroding the coalition backing Ukraine.
Since the beginning of the full-scale war, it has been clear that drip-funding Ukraine, self-imposing red lines, and avoiding so-called escalatory measures would be the most expensive path to victory. Yet time and again, key allies have chosen this approach. This has been devastating for Ukraine, which has endured unimaginable hardship so that Russia could be contained in a politically palatable way.
One of the most pressing challenges Ukraine faces is the condition of its power grid, which has been decimated by Russian attacks. While stopgap measures are in place, the country will likely face major blackouts this winter.
A combination of factors could spark a new refugee crisis (albeit much smaller than earlier waves). High-rise buildings, which house most of Ukraine’s urban residents, could become uninhabitable if water pumps fail due to power outages and burst pipes in subzero temperatures. Rolling blackouts will also affect schools – both remote and in shelters – forcing parents to leave rather than endure a fifth year (since Covid) of disrupted education for their children.
This, indeed, is Russia’s objective: depriving Ukrainians of energy to accelerate the ethnic cleansing of Ukraine’s territory. Additionally, a new wave of refugees could inflame anti-Ukrainian sentiment across the region.
Financial and social problems are also mounting. Ukraine faces a 2024 budget gap of Hr 500 billion (about $12 billion), though recent aid has slightly reduced this amount,  and another $15 billion shortfall next year. Even with more aid, this likely means tax hikes and inflation, further impacting living standards. With social discontent rising due to heavy-handed mobilization, the risks of populism and government dysfunction are growing.
Keeping Ukraine on the edge sustains Russian resolve, fostering the illusion that victory is near. This, in turn, makes peace terms even harder for Ukraine to accept. While the past years have shown that anything is possible, without significantly increased aid, we may be just as far – if not further – from a peace deal.
Editor’s Note: The opinions expressed in the op-ed section are those of the authors and do not purport to reflect the views of the Kyiv Independent.
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